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Case No. 20020123-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This is an appeal from a conviction of attempted tampering with evidence in violation 
of Utah Code Annotated §§ 76-8-510 and 76-4-101 (1999), a third degree felony, in the 
Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Timothy R. Hanson, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Annotated § 78-
2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2001). 
STATEMENT QF TTO |$SVg QN APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion to suppress evidence found 
during a warrantless search when detectives, responding to a tip that defendant and her 
companion were involved in illegal drug activity, observed defendant's companion conceal 
what appeared to be a crack pipe and watched both occupants engaging in other suspicious 
behavior? 
Factual findings underlying the trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
suppress evidence are reviewed for clear error. State v. Galvan, 2001 UT App 329, f 5, 37 
P.3d 1197 (quotation marks and citation omitted). However, the trial court's conclusions of 
law based on these facts are reviewed under a correctness standard. State v. McArthur, 2000 
UT App 23,112,996 P.2d 555 (quoting State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851,854-55 (Utah 1992)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION AND STATUTES 
The following constitutional provisions and statutes, relevant to the disposition of this 
case, are attached at Addendum A: 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution; 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1999); 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2 (1999); 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-8 (1999). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with tampering with evidence, a third degree felony in 
violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-510 (1999), unlawful possession of a controlled 
substance, a third degree felony in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) 
(1999), and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, a third degree felony in violation of 
Utah Code Annotated § 58-37a-5 (1999) (R. 2-5). 
Before trial, defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained during a search of her 
person and motel room (R. 34). The trial court denied the motion (R. 93; 116:24-26). 
Thereafter, defendant pleaded guilty to attempted tampering with evidence and attempted 
forgery, a charge stemming from unrelated events, reserving her right to appeal the attempted 
tampering with evidence conviction (R. 81 -87; 117:13-14). The court sentenced defendant 
2 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to a statutory term, not to exceed five years in prison, but suspended the sentence and placed 
defendant on probation (R. 95-96). Defendant timely appealed (R. 98).l 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS2 
On March 13, 2001, Detectives Troy Anderson and Tracy Ita of the Salt Lake City 
Police Department investigated a report that a Lisa Corwell and defendant might be '"using 
and/or selling narcotics" at a motel (R. 116:2-3,91).3 The informant specifically directed the 
detectives to room number 236 at the Motel 6, located at 1990 West North Temple Street in 
Salt Lake City (R. 116:2-3).4 
1
 The caption and jurisdictional statement of defendant's opening brief states that 
her appeal is from convictions of attempted tampering with evidence and attempted 
forgery. Aplt. Br at cover and 1. However, defendant's appeal is only from the attempted 
tampering conviction, as defendant's change of plea statement, the plea colloquy, the 
judgment, and the notice of appeal make clear (R. 81,95,98,117:2-3). 
2
 The facts are recited in a light most favorable to the trial court's findings from the 
suppression hearing. State v. Delaney, 869 P.2d 4, 5 (Utah App. 1994). 
3
 The trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress was based largely on Detective 
Anderson's testimony at the suppression hearing (Findings of Fact and;Conclusions of 
Law, "Ruling," R. 91-93, attached at Addendum B). However, it was also based on the 
parties' memoranda and Detective Anderson's testimony at the preliminary hearing, a 
copy of which was attached to defendant's memorandum in support of his motion to 
suppress (R. 26-32, 34-56). At the preliminary hearing, Detective Anderson asserted that 
the informant said both Corwell and defendant were involved with illegal drugs (R. 40). 
4
 The trial court treated the informant as "anonymous," although the evidence was 
various on this point (R. 116:24). At the preliminary hearing, Detective Anderson stated 
that information concerning Corwell's illegal drug activity came from Corwell's husband 
(R. 48). Also, in his supporting memorandum, defendant stated that the detectives "knew 
nothing about the tip except the person stated he was [the co-defendant's] husband" (R. 
36). However, at the suppression hearing, Detective Anderson stated that he did not 
recall if the informant had identified himself (R. 116:3,9). According to Detective 
Anderson, Detective Ita, who did not testify, received the informant's call (R. 116:2). 
3 
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Based on this information, the detectives went to the motel room and knocked on the 
door - "a knock and talk" (116:3). Detective Ita identified himself as "Tracy" and, after 
defendant expressed some confusion, Ita responded that he was "Tracy with the Salt Lake 
City Police Department" (R. 116:4). Also, in response to defendant's request, Detective Ita 
displayed his badge through the peep hole in the door, and Detective Anderson displayed his 
badge through an adjoining window (R. 116:4). Detective Anderson testified that there was 
a "six to twelve" inch gap between the curtain and the door through which he could see into 
the room (R. 116:4). When the officers asked defendant if Corwell was also in the room, 
defendant responded negatively (R. 116:5). However, after Anderson observed another 
woman in the room, defendant admitted to him that the other woman was, in fact, Lisa 
Corwell(R. 116:5). 
After the detectives displayed their badges and asked defendant to open the door, 
defendant unsuccessfully tried to close the gap in the curtains (R. 116:6). At that point, from 
about five to ten feet, Detective Anderson saw Corwell put what he thought was a crack pipe 
into a purse and then put it behind the bed (R. 116:4, 15). Anderson testified that he 
"initially thought it was a crack pipe. It was a metallic object that looked the size and shape 
of a crack pipe" (R. 116:6). On cross examination, Anderson firmly asserted several times 
that he "thought it was a crack pipe," consistent with his preliminary hearing testimony (R. 
41, 49-50; 116:12). When Detective Anderson later searched the purse, he found only a 
spoon (R. 116:12). 
Detective Anderson then observed "a lot of movement in the room" - - "[both women] 
4 " . 
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running around the room . . . both [going] into the bathroom [at least three times each].. . 
putting stuff behind the bed . . . under the bed" (R. 116:4, 7). Defendant's and Cornell's 
trips to the bathroom were significant to Detective Anderson because, in his experience, 
people in hotels often try to flush narcotics down the toilet (R. 116:7). 
The detectives repeatedly asked defendant to open the door (R. 116:3,6,8). Because 
she refused, Detective Ita obtained a key from the motel manager, who directed the 
detectives to evict the women if they were involved in illegal drug activity (R. 116:7-8). 
Even with the key the detectives were unable to enter the room because the women had 
engaged the dead-bolt (R. 116:8). When defendant repeatedly refused to open the door, 
Detective Ita kicked it open (R. 116:8). 
Once inside the room, Detective Anderson applied a twist lock to defendant, arrested 
her, and put her in flexible plastic handcuffs (R. 43). Corwell was placed in custody by other 
officers (R. 43). In defendant's right rear pocket, Detective Anderson found a metallic pipe, 
which defendant admitted she used to smoke cocaine (R. 43). Defendant became extremely 
hostile, demanding to be searched by a female officer (R. 43). When Detective Anderson 
learned that a female officer was en route to the scene, he stopped searching defendant (R. 
43). 
When Officer Patty Roberts arrived, she search both defendant and Corwell (R. 44). 
At that point, defendant admitted that she had cocaine on her person (R. 44). Officer Roberts 
searched defendant, finding in her bra a twist or baggie and a contact case containing 
substances which tested positively for cocaine (R. 44). Officer Roberts also found kleenex 
5 
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and a burnt brillo pad in defendant's pants (R. 44). She also found cocaine and drug 
paraphernalia on Corwell (R. 53). 
While being searched in the bathroom, defendant grabbed some of the cocaine from 
the counter, attempting to flush it down the drain (R. 45). A brief struggled ensued (R. 45). 
When Officer Roberts asked defendant what had happened to the twist, defendant asserted 
that it had fallen down the drain (R. 46). Officer Roberts found the twist in defendant's hand 
(R.46). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly upheld a warrantless search of defendant's motel room 
because the detectives performing the search had probable cause that defendant was involved 
in illegal drug activity and exigent circumstances justified an immediate entry. In addition 
to the reliability and content of the tip that directed the detectives to the motel room, probable 
cause was established when one of the detectives observed defendant's companion try to hide 
what reasonably appeared to be a crack pipe, followed by defendant's and her companion's 
apparent efforts to hide evidence and bar the detectives from entering. 
Additionally, exigent circumstances justified a warrantless search of the motel room. 
Defendant and her companion were engaging in behavior that led the officers to reasonably 
believe that evidence was being destroyed, precluding their obtaining a warrant in time to 
preserve the evidence. 
6 
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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE FOUND BY DETECTIVES 
DURING A SEARCH OF DEFENDANT'S MOTEL ROOM BECAUSE 
THE SEARCH WAS SUPPORTED BY BOTH PROBABLE CAUSE 
AND EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES 
Defendant claims that the police violated her right to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures because they lacked both probable cause and exigent circumstances to 
search her hotel room. Br. Aplt. 10-16. Contrary to defendant's claim, the search conducted 
by the detectives was supported by probable cause and exigent circumstances, and the trial 
court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence found as a result of that 
search. 
"[P]robable cause alone is never enough to search... and seize without a warrant." 
State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175, 179 (Utah 1983). "However, '[a] warrantless search of a 
residence is constitutionally permissible where probable cause and exigent circumstances are 
proven." State v. Yoder, 935 P.2d 534, 540 (Utah App. 1997) (citations: omitted). 
A. The search was supported by probable cause that 
defendant and her companion were engaged in illegal activity. 
Probable cause exists where '"the facts and circumstances within [the officers'] 
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in 
themselves to warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense is being 
committed."' State v. Comer, 2002 UT App 219, at % 21, _ P.3d _ (quoting State v. Dorsey, 
731 P.2d 1085,1088 (Utah 1986)) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (alterations in 
7 
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original). 'The probable cause determination is based on the 'totality of the circumstances.'" 
Yoder, 935 P.2d at 540 (citing State v. Nguyen, 878 P.2d 1183,1187 (Utah App. 1994)). The 
appellate court reviews the trial court's underlying findings of fact for clear error; it reviews 
the trial court's determination of probable cause for correctness, "giving the trial court a 
measure of discretion 'to apply the standard to the particular set of facts in the case.'" Id. 
(quoting Nguyen, at 1186). 
/. Based only on their observations of defendant's participation in patently 
criminal conduct, the detectives had probable cause to search the motel room. 
Defendant argues that the detectives lacked probable cause to enter and search the 
premises, based on this Court's analytic framework in State v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231 (Utah 
App. 1997) (reasonable suspicion), and State v. Valenzuela, 2001 UT App 332,37 P.3d 260, 
which applies that framework to the determination of probable cause. Aplt. Br. at 11 -14. See 
Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 235-36 (identifying three determinative factors for probable cause 
when police are relying on an informant's tip: 1) the "type of tip or informant involved," 2) 
"whether the informant gave enough detail about the observed criminal activity to support 
a stop," and 3) "whether the police officer's personal observations confirm the dispatcher's 
report on the informants tip-")- That framework, which places a premium on the "tip" which 
initiates an official investigation, is inapposite to this case. Here, probable cause was not 
based primarily on the tip, but rather on the detectives' observations of defendant's criminal 
conduct from a lawful position outside the motel room. 
In Valenzuela, this Court stated: 
8 
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Here, because the State predicates its probable cause argument upon 
information received from an informant, "we must examine the 'totality of the 
circumstances' to determine whether the informant's tip, together with police 
observations, provided probable cause to arrest" Valenzuela. [Emphasis 
added.] 
Id. at f ll(quoting State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1233 (Utah 1996) (quoting Gates v. 
Illinois, 462 U.S. 213,238,103 S. Ct. 2317,2332 (1983))). "Predicate" means "to affirm or 
base upon facts, arguments, conditions, etc." Webster's New World Dictionary 1149 (Coll. 
ed. 1957). The record shows that probable cause was hardly based on the tip. 
Detectives Anderson and Ita proceeded to the Motel 6 based on a tip that Corwell and 
another woman, later determined to be defendant, might be using and/or selling narcotics (R. 
116:2-3,91). The trial court gave short shrift to the tip, discussing it in only the first of its 
thirteen findings of fact (Ruling, R. 91-93; bench ruling, 116:24-26, attached at Addendum 
C). As such, the court implicitly recognized that the tip only initiated the detectives' 
investigation. See State v. Folkes, 565 P.2d 1125,1127 (Utah 1977) (officer's overhearing 
and viewing suspicious behavior relating to illegal drug use gave rise taduty to investigate). 
See Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 235-36 (holding that police must corroborate anonymous tip). The 
court specifically observed, "Had the officers not been able to see into the room then of 
course they would not have had the right to enter the room. They couldn't have gotten a 
warrant. But what they saw was evidence or what at least Officer Anderson saw, was 
evidence of the commission of a crime" (R. 116:25). Thus, the trial court upheld the entry 
into the motel room and ensuing search because they were justified by probable cause based 
not primarily on the tip, but on the detectives' observations of Corwell's and defendant's 
9 
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actions in plain view. See State v. 0 'Brien, 959 P.2d 647,649 (Utah App. 1998) ("A seizure 
is valid under the plain view doctrine if (1) the officer is lawfully present, (2) the item is in 
plain view, and (3) the item is clearly incriminating.") (citation omitted). 
Defendant does not claim that Detectives Anderson and Ita violated her rights by 
merely speaking with her from outside the closed door of her motel room during a "knock 
and talk," nor did they (R. 49,116:3). See United States v. Hammett, 236 F.3d 1054, 1059-
60 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 122 S. Ct. 152 (2001) (" Law enforcement officers may encroach 
upon the curtilage of a home for the purpose of asking questions of the occupants."); United 
States v. Davis, 327 F.2d 301, 303 (9th Cir. 1964) ("Absent express orders from the person 
in possession against any possible trespass, there is no rule of private or public conduct 
which makes it illegal per se, or a condemned invasion of the person's right of privacy, for 
anyone openly and peaceably, at high noon, to walk up the steps and knock on the front door 
of any man's 'castle' with the honest intent of asking questions of the occupant thereof-
whether the questioner be a pollster, a salesman, or an officer of the law.") The trial court 
found that a tip that drugs were being dealt from a motel room "certainly gives the officers 
the right to go over and knock on the door and talk with people if the people want to talk with 
them," a finding defendant does not dispute (R. 116:24). 
Further, defendant does not dispute that the crack pipe Detective Anderson saw and 
defendant's highly suspicious conduct was in his plain view and, therefore, the fruit of an 
legal search. "It is well established law that a government official does not engage in a search 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment if he observes incriminating evidence from a 
10 
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place where he has a right to be." State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175, 179 (Utah 1983) (finding 
lawful right to observe "extends to . . . front doors and other open areas accessible to the 
public at large."); United States v. Garcia, 997 F.2d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1993) ("We have 
held that officers walking up to the front door of a house can look inside through a partially 
draped open window without conducting a Fourth Amendment search."); United States v. 
Hersh, 464 F.2d 228,230 (9th Cir.) (viewing inculpatory evidence of illegal drug activity in 
plain view through partially curtained windows of residence not an illegal "search" within 
purview of Fourth Amendment), cert denied, 409 U.S. 1008,1059-60,93 S. Ct. 442 (1972). 
Consequently, defendant does not dispute the well-established rule that, assuming exigent 
circumstances, police may seize incriminating evidence observed in plain view. 
Rather, defendant challenges the trial court's findings and conclusions, arguing that 
what the detectives observed was not incriminating — that it did not constitute probable cause 
to break into the motel room and to search. Aplt. Br. at 14. That argument runs counter to 
the trial court's unchallenged findings of fact and sound conclusions of law. 
Detective Anderson consistently testified, both at the preliminary hearing and at the 
hearing on the motion to suppress, that he saw Lisa Corwell try to conceal what he believed 
was a crack pipe (R. 27, 35,41; 116:4, 6, 11-12). The trial court correctly recognized that 
although Detective Anderson was apparently wrong about actually seeing a "crack pipe," the 
error was immaterial because his belief was reasonable: 
It turned out he was wrong as to this spoon that turned out to be a spoon when 
he thought it was a crack pipe[,] but I don't find anything inherently 
unreasonable about that observation or that conclusion that he reached, even 
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though it was wrong. Whether it's right or wrong is not important. It's what 
he reasonably thought it was at the time . . . and I'm satisfied that Officer 
Anderson, by what he saw, thought that he observed a [sic] drug paraphernalia. 
(R. 116:25).5 See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.2 (e), at 37 (3d ed. 1996) 
noting probable cause may be supported by a reasonable mistake) (citing Maryland v. 
Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 87, 107 S. Ct 1013, 1018 (1987) (recognizing "the need to allow 
some latitude for honest mistakes that are made by officers in the dangerous and difficult 
process of making arrests")); United States v. Gonzales, 969 F.2d 999,1004 (11th Cir. 1992) 
(holding that officer's identification of the defendant's wife acting suspiciously "was 
ultimately found to be mistaken does not detract from the contribution this impression - // 
his mistake was objectively reasonable -made at the time to the totality of the circumstances 
leading to probable cause"); State v. Keitz, 856 P.2d 685,691 (Utah App. 1993) (plain view 
test for "clearly incriminating" evidence requires "an officer must only have a reasonable 
belief 'that certain items may be contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of a 
crime; it does not demand any showing that such belief be correct'") (citations omitted), 
abrogated on other grounds, State v. Montoya, 887 P.2d 857 (Utah 1994). 
It is a class B misdemeanor for a person to "use, or to possess with intent to use, drug 
paraphernalia to . . . ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the 
human body." Utah Code Ann. §58-37a-5 (1999). When Detective Anderson saw Corwell 
5
 The State does not concede that Detective Anderson was mistaken. Although 
only a spoon was found in the purse, a crack pipe was found in defendant's pocket (R. 43; 
116:12). 
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attempt to hide the "crack pipe," he saw her engaged in illegal activity. At that point, the 
detectives were justified in arresting and searching Corwell. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2 
(1999) ("A peace officer may..., without warrant, arrest a person: (1) for any public offense 
committed or attempted in the presence of any peace officer;" or (3) when he has reasonable 
cause to believe the person has committed a public offense, and there is reasonable cause for 
believing the person may . . . (b) destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of the 
offense). 
Defendant's actions also justified the detectives in arresting her as a party to Corwell's 
illegal activity and searching her.6 See State v. Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220,227-28 (Utah App. 
1995) (finding probable cause to arrest and search incident to arrest for possession of 
marijuana upon the defendant's evasive conduct and attempt to hide something and 
experienced officer's detecting odor of marijuana, which defendant denied smoking). 
The trial court findings, undisputed by defendant, are that at essentially the same time 
that Corwell put the "crack pipe" into her purse, "fbjoth defendants were running around the 
room, putting items into bags and under the bed and making several trips to the bathroom" 
(R. 92). From the bench, the court observed, 
Then, when I add to [Detective Anderson's belief that he saw a crack 
pipe] the fact that when they . . . identified themselves as police officers, the 
activity starts in the room that is consistent, may be consistent with cleaning 
6
 See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1999) ("Every person, acting with the mental 
state required for the commission of the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, 
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which constitutes 
an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct.") 
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up the room[J but that doesn't make sense. It's much more consistent under 
the circumstances, and at that point in time, with disposing of controlled 
substances. The officer testified that in his opinion, and it doesn't take a 
rocket scientist to know that, because controlled substances are disposable by 
flushing them down the toilet. There's a lot of activity, moving things about, 
going back and forth. All of that gives probable cause to enter the room and 
it also, because of the nature of the conduct, provides the sufficient exigent 
circumstances to kick in the door. 
(R. 25-26). The trial court also found that defendant refused to open the door and applied 
a deadbolt even after the detectives told her that they would force it open (R. 92). In sum, 
the detectives' direct observations of defendant's criminal conduct sufficiently support the 
trial court's conclusion that there was probable cause to believe defendant was involved in 
illegal drug activity. Applying the MulcahylValenzuela analysis only strengthens that 
conclusion. 
2. The informant's tip, taken with Officer Anderson's observations, 
amply established probable cause enter and search the motel room. 
As noted above, this Court in Valenzuela applied its analysis of reasonable suspicion 
to justify a traffic stop in Mulcahy, to determine probable cause when the police rely on an 
informant's tip: 1) the "type of tip or informant involved," 2) "whether the informant gave 
enough detail about the observed criminal activity to support a stop," and 3) "whether the 
police officer's personal observations confirm the dispatcher's report on the informants tip." 
Valenzuela 2001 UT App 332, at 115.. at 235, 236. This Court found its approach in 
weighing these factors, "consistent with the recent Utah Supreme Court decision embracing 
the 'totality of the circumstances' analysis articulated in Gates," Id. at f 17 (citing State v. 
Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229,1233 (Utah 1996)). See State v. Deluna, 2001 UT App 401, f 21, 
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40 P.3d 1136 (holding that minimal corroboration of the informant's tip was sufficient 
because the reliability of the information was high); Valenzuela, 2001 UT App 332, at f31 
(finding under the totality of the circumstances that a police officer did not have probable 
cause to arrest the defendant because information supplied by the informant was insufficient 
by itself and the officer had not corroborated the report). 
In this case, the strength of probable cause grows with consideration of each 
successive factor, until, as argued at Point I.A.l, above, the detectives' direct observations 
fully and independently confirm the tip, that defendant and her companion were engaged in 
illegal activity involving narcotics. See Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 236 ("The officer may 
corroborate the tip . . . by observing the illegal activity[.]") (citation omitted). 
The first Mulcahy factor - the informant 's identity 
Mulcahy first looks at the identity of the informant. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 235. In 
Mulcahy, the police informant was an ordinary citizen who identified himself to police 
dispatch. Id. at 233. This Court held that an "ordinary citizen-ififormant needs no 
independent proof of reliability or veracity. Id. at 235 (quotations and citations omitted). 
This is because a citizen informant volunteers information, not for personal benefit, but out 
of concern for the community and because an identified citizen informant is exposed to 
liability if the information is false. Id. 
In this case, the classification of the informant is unclear. While Detective Anderson 
clearly testified at the preliminary hearing that the tip came from Corwell's husband, he was 
unable at the suppression hearing to recall whom the tip came from (R. 48; 116:3, 9). The 
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trial court treated the tip an "anonymous" (R. 91; 116:24). Although an anonymous tip is 
"toward the lower end of the reliability scale," it may still support a finding of probable cause 
in when balanced with the other circumstances. Anonymous tips have an important place in 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. "[S]uch tips,. particularly when supplemented by 
independent police investigation, frequently contribute to the solution of otherwise 'perfect 
crimes.'" Gates, 462 U.S. at 237-38,103 S. Ct. at 2334-36 (finding probable caused where 
anonymous tip was detailed and substantially corroborated by police investigation). Here, 
like the citizen informant in Mulcahy, there is no evidence that the informant stood to gain 
by supplying the police with information. Moreover the reliability of the anonymous tip was 
augmented by its detail and ultimate corroboration. 
The second Mulcahy factor - the level of detail supplied by the informant 
The second factor in the Mulcahy analysis is the level of detail given by the informant. 
Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 236. In Mulcahy, the informant told the police that a drunk individual, 
possibly named "Joe," had been at the informant's front door and had driven away in a white 
car, "maybe" a Toyota Celica. Id. at 233. He also told the dispatcher the direction the car 
was headed and supplied, what he believed was, "Joe's" phone number. Id. This Court 
found that the informant "supplied sufficient detail to support a stop and detention," even 
though the officer observed no traffic violations or signs of intoxication. Id. at 234, 238. 
In a pre-Mulcahy case, the Utah Supreme Court found probable cause for a roadside 
arrest and vehicle search on details given in a tip comparable to those in Mulcahy. See 
Anderson, 910 P.2d at 1233. In that case, the defendant's girlfriend reported to the police 
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that the defendant had gone to Las Vegas to purchase methamphetamine. Id. at 1230. She 
also told police that the defendant and a companion would be returning to Millard County 
the following afternoon, in the defendant's Cadillac, via highway 257. Id. She then 
indicated that the defendant might be armed. Id. The following day, a second, confidential 
informant, confirmed the information the defendant's girlfriend had given the police. Id. 
The court found that the reliability of the girlfriend's statement was high because she 
supplied a substantial amount of detail. Id. at 1233. Additionally, her statement was verified 
in almost every aspect by the second informant. Id. 
The detail supplied by the informant in this case is comparable to that in Mulcahy and 
Anderson. In this case, Lisa Corwell's husband told dispatch that "Lisa and Rebecca[, 
defendant,] were in room 236" of the Motel 6 located at 1990 North Temple in Salt Lake (R. 
40; 116:2-3). The informant told the police that these women were "engaging in illegal 
activity - either using or selling narcotics" (R. 34; 116:2). Like the officers in both Mulcahy 
and Anderson, the detectives were told the identity of the alleged perpetrators, the number 
of possible suspects engaged in the illegal activity, the precise location of crime and the 
suspects, and the type of criminal behavior those suspects were engaging in. Although, the 
informant did not state his basis of knowledge concerning the information, the detectives 
would reasonably have relied on a family member's report presumably based on first-hand 
observation. See Deluna, 2001 UT App 401, at f 19 (family member's tip concerning the 
defendant's use of a methamphetamine lab significant because it based on personal 
observation); Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 238 (crediting informant's tip about drunk driver because 
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it was evidently based on first hand observations). In sum, the informant's tip was 
sufficiently detailed to support a finding of probable cause when supplemented with the 
detectives'corroborating observations. 
The third Mulcahy factor - the police officer's confirmation of the tip 
"The officer may corroborate the tip either by observing the illegal activity or by 
finding the person, the vehicle and the location substantially as described by the informant." 
Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 236 (citation omitted). In Mulcahy, the tip alerted police to an alleged 
drunken driver, but the investigating officer did not observe signs of intoxication in the 
defendant's driving pattern. Id. at 233. Consequently, this Court focused on the second 
means of corroboration, the confirmation of the "innocent details" to establish the tip's 
reliability. Id. at 236 (citing State v. Melanson, 665 A.2d 338, 340 (N.H. 1995)). Since 
criminals naturally tend to hide their illegal activity, Utah courts have regularly taken the tack 
used in Mulcahy. See Anderson, 910 P.2d at 1233 (concluding that because "officers had 
personally verified every aspect of the informants' reports except whether [the defendants] 
were actually transporting methamphetamine..., the police could justifiably conclude that 
the rest of the reports would also be true"); DeLuna, 2001 UT App 401, at f 20 (recognizing 
difficulty of confirming tip about family member's methamphetamine lab where police could 
not observe the alleged illegal activity or the facts provided by informants without entering 
the defendant's apartment); State v. Purser, 828 P.2d 515, 516, 518 (Utah App. 1992) 
(upholding probable cause to support search warrant where police confirmed all information 
supplied by informant except that pertaining to physical evidence of drug use and 
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manufacture). 
Lacking direct observations of illegal conduct, this Court has held that 
"[cjorroboration by the police officer means, in light of the circumstances, [that] he confirms 
enough facts so that he may reasonably conclude that the information provided is reliable." 
Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 236 (quoting State v. Sailo, 910 S.W.2d 184, 189 (Tex. App. 1995)) 
(internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, Utah's appellate courts have found official 
corroboration of a tip sufficient on far slimmer facts than in this case. See Anderson, 910 
P.2d at 1233 (the defendant's name, vehicle make, route, destination, date and time of 
departure and arrival); Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 237-38 (vehicle color, route, direction of travel, 
time of departure); Purser, 828 P.2d at 518 (the defendant's address, vehicle registration, 
police record, foot traffic to and from the defendant's house). 
In contradistinction to those cases referenced above, the detectives in this case 
corroborated the reliability of the tip not only by confirming all of the innocent details, but 
also by observing defendant's illegal conduct. The tip informed Detectives Anderson and Ita 
that defendant and Lisa Corwell were involved in illegal drug activity in room 236 at the 
Motel 6 at 1990 North Temple in Salt Lake City (R. 40; 116:2-3). The detectives went to the 
motel room identified by the informant and confirmed that two females were in the motel 
room and that one of those women was Corwell (R. 116:3-5). In accord with the trial court's 
findings, the State acknowledges that at this point the detectives lacked probable cause to 
search (R. 116:25). However, Detective Anderson contemporaneously observed defendant 
and Corwell involved in plainly illegal drug-related activity, hiding drug paraphernalia. See 
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Aple. Br. at Pt. I.A.I, above. In sum, the totality of the detectives' observations amply 
confirmed the reliability of the tip and supported probable cause to both arrest and search 
defendant and Corwell. 
B. Defendant's behavior created exigent circumstances, 
justifying the warrantless search of the motel room. 
The Fourth Amendment adopts a "strong preference for searches conducted pursuant 
to a warrant." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2331 (1983). Thus, 
"searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable." 
Paytonv. New York,445 U.S. 573,586, lOOS.Ct. 1371,1380(1980); CityofOrem v. Henri, 
868 P.2d 1384, 1387 (Utah App. 1994). However, "[police entry into a house without a 
warrant is not [ ] always unreasonable/' Murdoch v. Stout, 54 F.3d 1437, 1440 (9th Cir. 
1995). 
One exception to the warrant requirement is the exigent circumstances exception. 
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 653 n.3,104 S. Ct. 2626, 2630 n.3 (1984). Under this 
exception, a warrant is not required if the circumstances "involve[ ] a plausible claim of 
specially pressing or urgent law enforcement need, i.e., 'exigent circumstances.'" Illinois 
v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331,121 S. Ct. 946, 950 (2001). In these circumstances, "'the 
exigencies of the situation* make the need of law enforcement so compelling that the 
warrantless search is objectively reasonable." Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385,393-94,98 
S. Ct. 2408,2414 (1978) (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451,456,69 S. Ct. 
191,193 (1948)). "Exigent circumstances exist 'only when the inevitable delay incident to 
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obtaining a warrant must give way to an urgent need for immediate action.'" State v. Wells, 
928 P.2d 386,389 (Utah App. 1996) (quoting United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 844 
(11th Cir.1984)), affd 939 P.2d 1204 (Utah 1997). 
664
 While "exigent circumstances" have multiple characteristics, the guiding principle 
is reasonableness, and each case must be examined in the light of facts known to officers at 
the time they acted.'" Henrie, 868 P.2d at 1391 (quoting State v. Hert, 220 Neb. 447, 370 
N.W.2d 166, 170 (Neb. 1985)); see also Henrie, 868 P.2d at 1388 (holding that "[t]he 
determination of exigency is based on the totality of the circumstances"). 
"Numerous cases have sustained warrantless entries where the circumstances 
indicated that evidence might be destroyed or removed if entry was delayed until a warrant 
could be obtained." State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255,1258,1259 n.10, (Utah 1987) (citations 
omitted). See also Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-8 (1999) (authorizing a police officer to break the 
door or window of a building to arrest a person reasonably suspected of committing any 
public offense "where there is reason to believe evidence will be secreted or destroyed"). In 
Ashe, the Utah Supreme Court upheld a warrantless search of a suspected drug dealer's house 
based on probable cause and exigent circumstances that contraband would be destroyed if 
the police did not act immediately and before a warrant could be obtained. Id. at 1258-59. 
The evidence in support of exigent circumstances in this case is even weightier than in Ashe. 
In Ashe, officers arrested at a parking lot two codefendants, suspected of being 
defendant's middlemen, after an undercover officer made a small, initial purchase of cocaine 
in what was intended to be a still larger drug deal. Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1257. Based on their 
21 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
surveillance and voluntary statements of the middleman, officers knew that the defendant's 
residence was only two to five minutes from the parking lot and that he expected his 
middlemen to "quickly" return to expedite another, larger, purchase. Ashe, 745 P.2d at 
1257. Consequently, the officers were concerned that the defendant would become 
suspicious and destroy the remaining cocaine when his accomplices did not return. Id. 
When officers arrived at Ashe's home, one of them saw Ashe look out an upstairs window 
and then move away. Id. After knocking and identifying themselves, and briefly waiting for 
a response, the officers kicked open the front door. Id. Upon entering the residence, the 
officers heard a toilet flush and saw two bags containing white residue in the wastebasket 
near the toilet. Id. The court found that the "urgency of the situation escalated" with each 
of the subsequent events and there was "no realistic opportunity to seek a search warrant 
before the exigencies of the matter made it necessary to enter the dwelling." Id. at 1259, 
1260. The court added that the officers did not have to eliminate all innocent explanations 
for the behavior they observed, "so long as the explanation advanced by the . . . agents to 
support the search appealed] in all probability to be correct" Id. at 1261 (quoting U.S. v. 
Delguyd, 542 F.2d 346, 351 (6th Cir. 1972)) (first alteration in original). 
In this case, Detectives Anderson and Ita arrived at the motel room on a tip that 
Corwell and defendant were involved in illegal drug activity (R. 116:2-3). At the motel room 
door they knocked and identified themselves (R. 116:3-4). At the same time, Detective 
Anderson observed Corwell attempt to hide what appeared to be a crack pipe (R. 116:4). 
Also, immediately after the detectives identified themselves, Detective Anderson observed 
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defendant and Corwell "running in the room, putting stuff behind the bed and running to and 
from the bathroom" (R. 116:6). He saw the women go to the bathroom "at least three times" 
(R. 116:7). Defendant's hurried activity was particularly significant to Detective Anderson 
because, in his experience, suspects, especially in hotel rooms, will try to flush narcotics 
down the toilet to destroy them (R. 116:7). 
The foregoing record established probable cause and exigent circumstances for the 
detectives to enter the motel room without a warrant. See Aplt. Br. at Pt. I.A. 1. As the trial 
court correctly concluded, there was reason for the detectives to believe that defendants were 
in the act of destroying controlled substances (R. 93; 116:26). Indeed, the detectives' sense 
of the exigency was more reasonable than those of officers in Ashe. In Ashe, the defendant's 
apparent attempt to destroy incriminating evidence could only be reasonably assumed, Ashe, 
745 P.2d at 1265, whereas in this case those attempts were actually observed. 
In sum, the trial court correctly denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence. 
CQNClVStQN 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully requests that this Court 
affirm defendant's conviction. w 
On 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J_ day of August, 2002. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
' KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
76-2-202. Criminal responsibility for direct commission 
of offense or for conduct of another. 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of an 
offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, 
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which 
constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct. 
77-7-2. Arrest by peace officers. 
A peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a warrant or may, 
without warrant, arrest a person: 
(1) for any public offense committed or attempted in the presence of any 
peace officer, "presence" includes all of the physical senses or any device 
that enhances the acuity; sensitivity, or range of any physical sense, or 
records the observations of any of the physical senses; 
(2) when he has reasonable cause to believe a felony or a class A 
misdemeanor has been committed and has reasonable cause to believe 
that the person arrested has committed it; 
(3) when he has reasonable cause to believe the person has committed 
a public offense, and there is reasonable cause for believing the person 
may. 
(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest; 
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of the offense; or 
(c) injure another person or damage property belonging to another 
person. 
77-7-8. Doors and windows may be broken, when. 
To make an arrest, a private person, if the offense is a felony, and in all cases, 
a peace officer, may break the door or window of the building in which the 
person to be arrested is, or in which there are reasonable grounds for believing 
him to be. Before making the break, the person shall demand admission and 
explain the purpose for which admission is desired. Demand and explanation 
need not be given before breaking under the exceptions in Section 77-7-6 or 
where there is reason to believe evidence will be secreted or destroyed. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, '. I : 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
-v.- I 
Case No. 011905093 
REBECCA CHAMPNEYS, 
Hon. Timothy R. Hanson 
Defendant. | 
This matter came on for a Motion to Suppress hearing on September 19, 2001, 
before the Court, the Honorable Timothy R Hanson, District Court Judge, presiding. 
The State was represented by Deputy District Attorney Lana Taylor. The Defendant was 
present and represented by David Finlayson. Evidence was presented in the form of 
testimony from Detective Troy Anderson. The Court, based upon the evidence and 
argument presented at the hearings, the memorandums of law submitted by counsel, and 
for good cause shown, makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On March 13,2001, Salt Lake City Detective Troy Anderson and other 
officers investigated a report that Defendant Corwell was involved in using or selling 
illegal drugs in a motel room, located at 1990 West North Temple, in Salt Lake County. 
DAVID E.YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
LANA TAYLOR, Bar No. 7642 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)363-7900 
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2. The officers knocked on the door of the motel room and asked if 
defendant Corwell was present. 
3. Defendant Champneys spoke to the officers through the door and said that 
Corwell was not there. 
4. Detective Anderson could see into the room through the window and saw 
both Defendants Champneys and Corwell. 
5. Defendant Corwell then told the officers that she was in the room. 
6. The officers identified themselves and asked if they could enter the room. 
7. Through the window, Detective Anderson saw Defendant Corwell put 
what appeared to be a black crack pipe into a purse, which was on the bed. Corwell then 
put the purse behind the bed. Both defendants were running around the room, putting 
items into bags and under the bed and making several trips to the bathroom. 
8. The officers asked the defendants to open the door, and the defendants 
refused. 
9. The officer told the defendants that if they did not open th? door, they 
would have to force the door open and the defendants again refused to open the door. 
10. One of the officers received a key to the room from the manager of the 
motel, who said that he wanted the defendants "kicked out.'9 
11. The officers tried to use the key to enter the room, but the door was dead-
bolted. 
12. The officers kicked the door in and arrested the defendants for interfering 
with a police investigation. 
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13. Defendants Champneys and Corwell were searched and officers found the 
evidence in this case, which consisted of cocaine and drug paraphernalia. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and enters the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The officers had probable cause to believe that drug activity was occurring 
in the room as a result of the information they were provided and the facts, which 
confirmed that information. 
2. The officers had exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless entry into 
the motel room as a result of the defendants' actions, which indicated that they were 
concealing and destroying evidence. 
3. The evidence in this case was lawfully seized pursuant to the probable 
cause and exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
DATED this ^ day of iQjiL/ 
Approved as to Form: 
Attorney for the Defendant 
Finlavson 
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District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
LANA TAYLOR, Bar No. 7642 
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Telephone. (801)363-7900 
IN THE THIRD RJDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 





ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
Case No. 011905093 
Hon. Timothy R Hanson 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence is 
denied. 
DATED this day of. 
JUDGE 
Approved as to Form: 
David Finlayson 
Attorney for the Defendant 
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information that drug activity is going on, they see things 
that confirm that, probable cause that there's drug activity in 
that room and the exigent circumstances are created when these 
individuals in the room start hiding things. Hiding things in 
purses, hiding purses behind beds, running back to the 
bathroom. In their experience as narcotics officers, that is 
very consistent with things they've seen in the past destroying 
evidence. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
Submit the matter? 
MR. ANDERSON: Yes, Your Honor. 
MR. FINLAYSON: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: I think I'm ready to rule on this one. 
Like most of these matters, what happens in the information, 
whether it's corroborated or it comes from an anonymous source, 
builds as the time goes along. So that's why I'm required to 
look at the totality of the circumstances. 
Here we have an anonymous tip that there's drug 
dealing going on in this room where apparently the defendant, -
I'll get everybody's name right here - Lisa Corewell is in the 
room. That certainly gives the officers the right to go over 
and knock on the door and talk with people if the people want 
to talk to them and they did that and they also confirmed, 
which gives support to the anonymous tip, is that Lisa 
Corewell, ultimately, she was in the room and so therefore, we 
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1 haven't just got somebody making a phone call. We've got 
2 somebody making a phone call with some information that appears 
3 to be at least as far as that's concerned, correct. 
4 Had the officers not been able to see into the room 
5 then of course they would not have had the right to enter the 
6 j room. They couldn't have got a warrant. But what they saw was 
7 evidence or what at least Officer Anderson saw, was evidence of 
8 the commission of a crime. It turned out he was wrong as to 
9 this spoon that turned out to be a spoon when he thought it was 
10 a crack pipe but I don't find anything inherently unreasonable 
11 about that observation or that conclusion that he reached, even 
12 though it was wrong. Whether it's right or wrong, is not 
13 important. It's what he reasonably thought it was at the time. 
14 That would be like saying, Well, they didn't know there were 
15 drugs but they found them, therefore, it's okay. We don't 
16 accept that either. So, it's not the product of the search 
17 that's important or what's actually found, but what is 
18 reasonably in the minds of the person at the time and I'm 
19 satisfied that Officer Anderson, by what he saw, thought that 
20 he observed a drug paraphernalia. 
21 j Then, when I add to that the fact that when they 
22 , identified them as police officers, identified themselves as 
23 police officers, the activity starts in the room that is 
24 consistent, may be consistent with cleaning up the room but 
25 that doesn't make sense. It's much more consistent under the 
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1 circumstances, and at that point in time, with disposing of 
2 controlled substances. The officer testified that in his 
3 ; opinion, and it doesn't take a rocket scientist to know that, 
4 because controlled substances are disposable by flushing them 
5 down the toilet. There's a lot of activity, moving things 
6 about, going back and forth. All of that gives probable cause 
7 to enter the room and it also, because of the nature of the 
8 conduct, provides the sufficient exigent circumstances to kick 
9 in the door. 
10 If the exigent circumstances weren't there, they 
11 would have had to get a warrant. I'm satisfied there was 
12 enough to get a warrant based on what was expressed to that 
13 point in time and what was observed. The exigent circumstances 
14 give them the right to kick in the door when it's bolted even 
15 though they - have the key makes no difference. Who gave them 
16 the key makes no difference, but not being able to get in even 
17 with the key, they had the right to kick down the door because 
18 I think it's reasonable to believe that they thought that there 
19 were controlled substances being destroyed. And so, therefore, 
20 the motion is denied. There's probable cause and I believe 
21 there's exigent circumstances. So let's set the matter for 
22 trial. 
23 MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, would you like the State to 
24 prepare findings, conclusions in an order? 
25 THE COURT: Please. 
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